Is the "reason of state" reasonable in its principle?

December 7, 2015

In these somewhat troubled times in France, I propose a philosophical reflection on the notion of Reason of State, before the next brief which will deal with "the psychiatrist and the politician" (can the psychiatrist, even if he wished to, abstract himself from the political field?).

I do not wish, at this stage, and although I am being asked to do so by my foreign contacts, to discuss French "news" because the general situation is far too emotional and inflammatory for debates and ideas to circulate freely and constructively.

Therefore, why not take a broader perspective, by deploying the philosophical concept of "Reason of State"?

The reason of state is a moment invoked by the power which, in the name of the public interest, justifies political procedures which are illegal in peacetime.

It invests itself with an unquestionable, unconditional power, alleging the Right to escape the Law.

There is therefore a tension, that between the legitimacy of the public interest and that of the interest of individuals.

This tension creates a paradox: that of violating the law in the name of the law.

The reason of state defies common rationality, and has often revealed in history, behind it, the imposture of the state which claims to transgress the private interest of individuals in the name of a higher interest.

Every reason of state is underpinned by a tyranny, the probity of which everyone will be free to question, in the name of the superior legitimacy of the state.

Montesquieu clearly articulated the necessary independence of the three branches of government—legislative, judicial, and executive—without which there can be no democracy. Reason of State disregards such independence, considering itself "above", "beyond", a higher interest.

With the concept of "reason of state", the theory of exception prevails: exception to laws, to morality, to the inextricable relationship between freedom and security. Then comes the "law of suspects" of which Hegel spoke: everyone suspects their neighbor and is potentially suspect; denunciation is now encouraged.

By suppressing freedom, in whole or in part, the reason of state places its own citizens in a state of insecurity.

If they entrust their entire freedom to the State (and not only a part, as Rousseau advocated, that part which, if I entrust it to the community, will increase my own freedom in return), they will no longer be safe but at the mercy of any abusive power.

Whether there is an internal or external enemy, imagined or real, will not change anything.

However, Cicero said in De Officiis that Reason of State can exceptionally and effectively be invoked, only insofar as it responds to a higher moral law and aims at the Public Good.

So there would be good reasons of state, and bad ones.

For Cicero, a good reason of state meets all of the following criteria:

1° Honestas

The unwavering honesty of a good leader

2° Utilitas

The undeniable usefulness of the public good

3° Necesitas

The circumstances that compel the ruler to deviate from common rules according to the necessity of a higher moral law.

If the three criteria are not met, then the reason of state risks resembling an absolute power of domination by which all methods will be used to retain power and attempt to maintain it as an absolute value. Thus, according to Machiavelli, the reason of state invoked could very quickly become devoid of any moral value and embody the figure of evil in politics.

For political philosophers of all persuasions, from Machiavelli to Hobbes, there exists a relationship of distrust between rulers and the ruled, with security being the primary concern. For dishonest power seeking to maintain its grip on the state, the objective is to disarm its subjects and reduce them to the status of children, massively dependent on parental protection.

Therefore, the reason of state is, with rare exceptions, the site of peaks of violence under the rules of necessity.

So, how do we do it?

Does the State have the right to deviate from moral norms in the name of the higher interest of the State?

The risk is that of the exclusive interest of the rulers and the political class against the people (and let the people not be fooled, the supposed divisions of the political class are often only superficial divisions, the real division being that which separates the people from those who govern them and try to dominate them).

Does the State have the right to transgress the very laws of its own institution?

It is obvious that the State cannot deviate from its own Constitution without losing itself and thereby losing the foundation of respect for its people and their freedom.

The principle of "reason of state" is refutable.

She states: "I sacrifice you", or, "I sacrifice an innocent person for the salvation of all."

In this respect, she rejects the expression "Public Good".

The end never justifies the means. To say otherwise actually means that one will take as a means what is not a means.

For example, in the name of security and the prohibition of murder, we will allow ourselves to make some innocent people unsafe or to kill them.

Several questions of moral and political philosophy arise for us and would deserve to be extensively debated if the conditions for such a debate could be established today:

1. Do we have the right to sacrifice the salvation of a citizen to that of a state, even if we invoke the necessity of the public interest?

2. Do we have the right to sacrifice the relationship of justice between states to the particular interest of one of them?

3. Isn't the confiscation of the common good a hallmark of tyranny?

When rulers and the political class lose their legitimacy, it is very common for them to invoke the reason of state.

They can even create events in this direction, to maintain their power at all costs, like Nero and the fire of Rome created entirely by himself and his acolytes to justify the persecution of Christians.

This is precisely the rationality of calculation that Machiavelli spoke of, who taught us that politics (almost) always works through hidden conspiracies.

In short, the Reason of State demands the suppression of legality enshrined in legality, and thus arrogates to itself an absolute legitimacy, which defies the contingency of human justice, by self-proclaiming itself as transcendent, omniscient and omnipotent justice, of divine essence.

However, it has been well known since the Ancient Greeks that manifestations of excess ("hubris"), whatever they may be, where a human thinks he is a god, will be severely punished in their effects.

Ariane Bilheran, a graduate of the prestigious École Normale Supérieure, is a psychologist, holds a doctorate in psychopathology, and is the author of numerous works.